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Peirce on Intuition, Instinct, &
Common Sense
Kenneth Boyd and Diana Heney
AUTHOR'S NOTE
We thank our audience at the 2017 Canadian Philosophical Association meeting at Ryerson
University for a stimulating discussion of the main topics of this paper. Thanks also to our
wonderful co-panelists on that occasion, who gathered with us to discuss prospects for
pragmatism in the 21st century: Shannon Dea, Pierre-Luc Dostie Proulx, and Andrew
Howat.
1 In addition to being a founder of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce was a
scientist  and  an  empiricist.  Peirce’s  methodological  commitments  are  as  readily  on
display in his philosophical endeavours as in his geodetic surveys. In both, and over the
full course of his intellectual life, Peirce exhibits what he terms the laboratory attitude:
“my attitude was always that of a dweller in a laboratory, eager to learn what I did not yet
know, and not that of philosophers bred in theological seminaries, whose ruling impulse
is to teach what they hold to be infallibly true” (CP 1.4). Alongside a scientific mindset
and a commitment to the method of inquiry,  where does common sense fit  in? That
Peirce is with the person contented with common sense “in the main” suggests that there
is a place for common sense, systematized, in his account of inquiry – but not at the cost
of critical examination.
2 Peirce does at times directly address common sense; however, those explicit engagements
are relatively infrequent. In this paper, we argue that getting a firm grip on the role of
common sense in Peirce’s philosophy requires a three-pronged investigation, targeting
his treatment of common sense alongside his more numerous remarks on intuition and 
instinct. By excavating and developing Peirce’s concepts of instinct and intuition, we show
that his respect for common sense coheres with his insistence on the methodological
superiority  of  inquiry.  We  conclude  that  Peirce  shows  us  the  way  to  a  distinctive
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epistemic position balancing fallibilism and anti-scepticism, a pragmatist common sense
position of considerable interest for contemporary epistemology given current interest in
the relation of intuition and reason.
 
Common Sense, Take 1: A Tension
3 Peirce’s discussions of  common sense are often accompanied by a comparison to the
views of the “Scotch philosophers,” among whom Peirce predominantly includes Thomas
Reid.1 This is not surprising:  Reid was a significant influence on Peirce,  and for Reid
common sense played an important role in his epistemology and view of inquiry. Peirce
takes his “critical common-sensism” to be a variant on the “common-sensism” that he
ascribes to Reid, so much so that Peirce often feels the need to be explicit about how his
view is different. Here, then, we want to start by looking briefly at Reid’s conception of
common sense, and what Peirce took the main differences to be between it and his own
views. As we will see, what makes Peirce’s view unique will also be the source of a number
of tensions in his view.
4 For Reid, “common sense” is polysemous, insofar as it can apply both to the content of a
particular judgment (what he will  sometimes refer to as a “first principle”) and to a
faculty that he takes human beings to have that produces such judgments. Common sense
judgments are not “common” in the sense in which most people have them, but are
common  insofar  as  they  are  the  product  of  a  faculty  which  everyone  possesses.  A
significant aspect of Reid’s notion of common sense is the role he ascribes to it  as a
ground for inquiry. As John Greco (2011) argues, common sense for Reid has both an
epistemic and methodological priority in inquiry: judgments delivered by common sense
are epistemically prior insofar as they are known non-inferentially, and methodologically
prior,  given that  they are  first  principles that  act  as  a  foundation for  inquiry.  With
respect to the former, Reid says of beliefs delivered by common sense that “[t]here is no
searching for evidence,  no weighing of arguments;  the proposition is not deduced or
inferred from another; it has the light of truth in itself, and has no occasion to borrow it
from another”  (Essays  VI,  IV:  434);  with  respect  to  the  latter,  Reid  argues  that  “all
knowledge got by reasoning must be built upon first principles. This is as certain as that
every house must have a foundation.” (Essays VI, IV: 435). Since reasoning must start
somewhere, according to Reid, there must be some first principles, ones which are not
themselves  the  product  of  reasoning.  Furthermore,  since  these  principles  enjoy  an
epistemic priority, we can be assured that our inquiry has a solid foundation, and thus
avoid the concerns of the skeptic.
5 In these broad terms we can see why Peirce would be attracted to a view like Reid’s.
Peirce is, of course, adamant that inquiry must start from somewhere, and from a place
that we have to accept as true, on the basis of beliefs that we do not doubt. So one might
think  that  Peirce,  too,  is  committed  to  some  class  of  cognitions  that  possesses
methodological  and  epistemic  priority.  But  as  we  will  shall  see,  despite  surface
similarities,  their  views  are  significantly  different.  Notably,  Peirce  does  not  grant
common sense either epistemic or methodological priority, at least in Reid’s sense.
6 Peirce  spends  much  of  his  1905  “Issues  of  Pragmaticism”  distinguishing  his  critical
common-sensism from the view that he attributes to Reid. Here, Peirce agrees with Reid
that inquiry must have as a starting point some indubitable propositions. He disagrees
with Reid, however, about what these starting points are like: Reid considers them to be
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fixed and determinate (Peirce says that although the Scotch philosophers never wrote
down all the “original beliefs,” they nevertheless thought “it a feasible thing, and that the
list would hold good for the minds of all men from Adam down” (CP5.444)), but for Peirce
such  propositions  are  liable  to  change  over  time  (EP2:  349).  That  common  sense  is
malleable in this way is at least partly the result of the fact that common sense judgments
for Peirce are inherently vague and aspire to generality: we might have a common sense
judgment  that,  for  example,  ‘Man is  mortal,’  but  since  it  is  indeterminate  what  the
predicate ‘mortal’ means, the content of the judgment is thus vague, and thus liable to
change depending on how we think about mortality as we seek the broadest possible
application of the judgment.
7 Peirce takes the second major point of departure between his view and that of the Scotch
philosophers to be the role of doubt in inquiry and, in turn, the way in which common
sense judgments have epistemic priority. For Peirce, common sense judgments, like any
other kind of judgment, have to be able to withstand scrutiny without being liable to
genuine doubt in order to be believed and in order to play a supporting role in inquiry.
For Reid, however, first principles delivered by common sense have positive epistemic
status even without them having withstood the scrutiny of doubt. This is not to say that
they have such a status simply because they have not been doubted. As Peirce notes, this
kind of “innocent until proven guilty” interpretation of Reid’s common sense judgments
is mistaken, as it conflates two senses of “because” in the common-sensist’s statement
that common sense judgments are believed because they have not been criticized: one
sense in which a judgment not having been criticized is a reason to believe it, and another
sense in which it is believed simply because one finds oneself believing it and has not
bothered to criticize it. Peirce states that neither he nor the common-sensist accept the
former,  but  that  they both accept  the latter  (CP 5.523).  Nevertheless,  common sense
judgments for Reid do still have epistemic priority, although in a different way. As Greco
puts  it,  “Reid’s  account  of  justification  in  general  is  that  it  arises  from the  proper
functioning of our natural, non-fallacious cognitive faculties” (149), and since common
sense for Reid is one such faculty, our common sense judgments are thus justified without
having to withstand critical attention.
8 This is  a  significant point of  departure for Peirce from Reid.  As we will  see in what
follows, that Peirce is ambivalent about the epistemic status of common sense judgments
is reflective of his view that there is no way for a judgment to acquire positive epistemic
status  without  passing through the tribunal  of  doubt.  Furthermore,  we will  see  that
Peirce does not ascribe the same kind of methodological priority to common sense that
Reid does, as Peirce does not think that there is any such thing as a “first cognition”
(something that Reid thinks is necessary in order to stop a potential infinite regress of
cognitions).
9 Although we have seen that  in contrasting his  views with the common-sense Scotch
philosophers Peirce says a lot of things about what is view of common sense is not, he does
not say a lot about what common sense is. In fact, to the extent that Peirce’s writings
grapple with the challenge of constructing his own account of common sense, they do so
only in a piecemeal way. To make matters worse, the places where he does remark on
common sense directly can offer a confusing picture. That common sense for Peirce lacks
the kind stability and epistemic and methodological priority ascribed to it by Reid means
that it will be difficult to determine when common sense can be trusted.2
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10 This brings us back our opening quotation, which clearly contains the tension between
common sense and critical examination. Peirce is with the person who is contented with
common sense – at least, “in the main.” This makes sense; after all, he has elsewhere
described  speculative  metaphysics  as  “puny,  rickety,  and  scrofulous”  (CP  6.6),  and
common sense as part of  what’s  needed to navigate our “workaday” world,  where it
“usually hits the nail on the head” (CP 1.647; W3 10-11). But in the same quotation, Peirce
also affirms fallibilism with respect to both the operation and output of common sense:
some of  those beliefs  and habits  which get  lumped under the umbrella  of  “common
sense” are “merely obiter dictum.” The so-called ‘first principles’ of both metaphysics
and  common  sense  are  open  to,  and  must  sometimes  positively  require,  critical
examination. Peirce’s scare quotes here seem quite intentional, for the principles taken as
bedrock  for  practical  purposes  may,  under  scrutiny,  reveal  themselves  to  be  the
bogwalker’s  ground  –  a  position  that  is  “only  provisional,”  where  one  must  “find
confirmations or else shift its footing. […] It still is not standing upon the bedrock of fact.
It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here
I will  stay till  it  begins to give way.” (CP 5.589). We can conclude that,  epistemically
speaking, an appeal to common sense does not mean that we get decision principles for
nothing and infallible beliefs for free. Nonetheless, common sense has some role to play.
11 Further examples add to the difficulty of pinning down his considered position on the
role and nature of common sense.  In one of Peirce’s best-known papers,  “Fixation of
Belief,” common sense is portrayed as deeply illogical:
We can see that a thing is  blue or green, but the quality of being blue and the
quality of being green are not things which we see; they are products of logical
reflection. The truth is, that common-sense, or thought as it first emerges above
the level of the narrowly practical, is deeply imbued with that bad logical quality to
which the epithet metaphysical is commonly applied; and nothing can clear it up
but a severe course of logic. (EP 1.113)
12 The charge here is that methodologically speaking, common sense is confused. Given the
context – an argument in favour of inquiry by way of critique against other methods – we
might dismiss this as part of a larger insistence that belief fixation should (in order to
satisfy its  own function and in a normative sense of  ‘should’)  be logical,  rather than
driven by fads, preferences, or temporary exigencies.
13 Nor is “Fixation” the only place where Peirce refers derisively to common sense. A similar
kind of charge is made in the third of Peirce’s 1903 Harvard lectures:
Suppose two witnesses A and B to have been examined, but by the law of evidence
almost their whole testimony has been struck out except only this: A testifies that
B’s testimony is true. B testifies that A’s testimony is false. Common sense would
certainly declare that nothing whatever was testified to. But I cannot admit that
judgments of common sense should have the slightest weight in scientific logic,
whose duty it is to criticize common sense and correct it. (PPM 175)
14 While the 1898 Cambridge lectures are one of the most contentious texts in Peirce’s body
of written work, the Harvard lectures do not have such a troubled interpretive history.
We stand with other scholars who hold that Peirce is serious about much of what he says
in the 1898 lectures (despite their often ornery tone),3 but there is no similar obstacle to
taking the Harvard lectures seriously.4 So we must consider how common sense could be
both unchosen and above reproach, but also open to and in need of correction. 
15 How can these criticisms of common sense be reconciled with Peirce’s remark there is no
“direct profit in going behind common sense” – no point, we might say, in seeking to
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undermine it? It is clear that there is a tension here between the presentation of common
sense as “those ideas and beliefs that man’s situation absolutely forces upon him” and
common  sense  as  a  way  of  thinking  “deeply  imbued  with  […]  bad  logical  quality,”
standing in need of criticism and correction. How can what is forced upon one even be
open to correction? Must we accept that some beliefs and ideas are forced, and that this
places them beyond the purview of logic? Such a move would seem to bring Peirce much
closer to James than he preferred to see himself.5 It would also seem to cut against what
Peirce  himself  regarded as  the  highest  good of  human life,  the  growth of “concrete
reasonableness”  (CP 5.433;  8.138),  which might  fairly  be  regarded as  unifying logical
integrity with everyday reasoning – reasonableness, made concrete,  could thereby be
made common, as it would be instantiated in real and in regular patterns of reasoning. 
16 Despite this tension, we are cautiously optimistic that there is something here in Peirce’s
thought  concerning  common  sense  which  is  important  for  the  would-be  Peircean;
furthermore, by untangling the knots in Peirce’s portrayal of common sense we can apply
his view to a related debate in contemporary metaphilosophy, namely that concerning
whether we ought to rely on what we find intuitive when doing philosophy. In order to
help untangle these knots we need to turn to a number of related concepts, ones that
Peirce is not typically careful in distinguishing from one another: intuition, instinct, and
il lume naturale. We argue that all of these concepts are importantly connected to common
sense for Peirce. We start with Peirce’s view of intuition, which presents an interpretive
puzzle of its own.
 
A Neighboring Puzzle: Common Sense Without
Intuition
17 A 21st century reader might well expect something like the following line of reasoning:
Peirce is a pragmatist; pragmatists care about how things happen in real social contexts;
in such contexts people have shared funds of experience, which prime certain intuitions
(and even make them fitting or beneficial); so: Peirce will offer an account of the place of
intuition in guiding our situated epistemic practices. That reader will be disappointed.
Instead, we find Peirce making the surprising claim that there are no intuitions at all.
18 This claim appears in Peirce’s earliest (and perhaps his most significant) discussion of
intuition, in the 1868 “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Man.” Here,
Peirce  challenges  the  Cartesian  foundationalist  view that  there  exists  a  class  of  our
cognitions whose existence do not depend on any other cognitions, which can be known
immediately, and are indubitable. A member of this class of cognitions are what Peirce
calls an intuition, or a “cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same
object, and therefore so determined by something out of the consciousness” (CP 5.213;
EP1: 11, 1868). Peirce’s main goal throughout the work, then, is to argue that, at least in
the sense in which he presents it here, we do not have any intuitions.
19 To get  to  this  conclusion we need to first  make a  distinction between two different
questions: whether we have intuitions, and whether we have the faculty of intuition. These
two questions go together: first, to have intuitions we would need to have a faculty of
intuition, and if we had no reason to think that we had such a faculty we would then
similarly lack any reason to think that we had intuitions; second, in order to have any
reason to think that we have such a faculty we would need to have reason to think that
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we have such intuitions. Peirce thus attacks the existence of intuitions from two sides:
first by asking whether we have a faculty of intuition, and second by asking whether we
have intuitions at all. His answer to both questions is negative.
20 In arguing against a faculty of intuition, Peirce notes that,  while we certainly feel as
though some of our beliefs and judgments are ones that are the result of an intuitive
faculty, we are generally not very good at determining where our cognitions come from.
For instance, inferences that we made in the past but for which we have forgotten our
reasoning are ones that we may erroneously identify as the result of intuition. Peirce here
provides examples of an eye-witness who thinks that they saw something with their own
eyes but instead inferred it, and a child who thinks that they have always known how to
speak their mother tongue, forgetting all the work it took to learn it in the first place.
Indeed, Peirce notes that many things that we used to think we knew immediately by
intuition we now know are actually the result of a kind of inference: some examples he
provides are our inferring a three-dimensional world from the two-dimensional pictures
that are projected on our retinas (CP 5.219), that we infer things about the world that are
occluded from view by our visual blind spots (CP 5.220), and that the tones that we can
distinguish depend on our comparing them to other tones that we hear (CP 5.222).
21 That the presence of our cognitions can be explained as the result of inferences we either
forgot about or did not realize we made thus undercuts the need to posit the existence of
a distinct faculty of intuition. Where intuition seems to play the largest role in our mental
lives, Peirce claims, is in what seems to be our ability to intuitively distinguish different
types  of  cognitions  –  for  example,  the  difference  between  imagination  and  real
experience – and in our ability to know things about ourselves immediately and non-
inferentially. But in both cases, Peirce argues that we can explain the presence of our
cognitions again by inference as opposed to intuition. Consider what appears to be our
ability to intuit that one of our cognitions is the result of our imagination and another the
result of our experience: surely we are able to tell fantasy from reality, and the way in
which we do this at least seems to be immediately and non-inferentially. Not so, says
Peirce: that we can tell the difference between fantasy and reality is the result not of
intuition, but an inference on the basis of the character of those cognitions. In effect,
cognitions produced by fantasy and cognitions produced by reality feel different, and so
on the basis of those feelings we infer their source.
22 Denying the claim that we have an intuitive source of self-knowledge commits Peirce to
something more radical,  namely that we lack any power of  introspection,  as long as
introspection is conceived of as a way of coming to have beliefs about ourselves and our
mental lives directly and non-inferentially. Instead, all of our knowledge of our mental
lives is again the product of inference, on the basis of “external facts” (CP 5.244). That we
can account for our self-knowledge through inference as opposed to introspection again
removes the need to posit the existence of any kind of intuitive faculty.
23 Thus,  Peirce’s  argument  is  that  if  we  can  account  for  all  of  the  cognitions  that  we
previously thought we possessed as a result of intuition by appealing to inference then we
lack reason to believe that  we do possess  such a  faculty.  There is,  however,  a  more
theoretical reason why we might think that we need to have intuitions. The reason is the
same reason why Reid attributed methodological priority to common sense judgments: if
all cognitions are determined by previous cognitions, then surely there must, at some
point in the chain of determinations, be a first cognition, one that was not determined by
anything before it, lest we admit of an infinite regress of cognitions. This regress appears
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vicious: if all cognitions require an infinite chain of previous cognitions, then it is hard to
see how we could come to have any cognitions in the first place. Hence, we must have
some intuitions, even if we cannot tell which cognitions are intuitions and which ones are
not.
24 Peirce does not purport to solve this problem definitively;  rather,  he argues that the
apparent regress is not a vicious one.  He compares the problem to Zeno’s paradox –
namely the problem of accounting for how Achilles can overtake a tortoise in a race,
given that Achilles has to cover an infinite number of intervals in order to do so: that we
do not have a definitive solution to this problem does not mean that Achilles cannot best
a tortoise  in a  footrace.  Similarly,  although a  cognition might  require a  chain of  an
infinite  number  of  cognitions  before  it,  that  does  not  mean  that  we  cannot  have
cognitions at all. If we accept that the necessity of an infinity of prior cognitions does not
constitute a vicious regress, then there is no logical necessity in having a first cognition
in order to explain the existence of cognitions. One of the consequences of this view,
which Peirce spells out in his “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” is that “we have
no power of intuition, but every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions”
(CP 5.265). Thus, cognitions arise not from singular previous cognitions, but by a “process
of cognition” (CP 5.267). Here, then, we see again how Peirce’s view differs from Reid’s:
there are no individual judgments that have methodological priority, because there is no
need for a regress-stopper for cognitions.
25 Peirce, then, is unambiguous in denying the existence of intuitions at the end of the
1860s. So it is rather surprising that Peirce continues to discuss intuitions over the course
of his writings, and not merely to remind us that they do not exist. Unsurprisingly, given
other  changes  in  the  way  Peirce’s  system  is  articulated,  his  engagement  with  the
possibility of intuition takes a different tone after the turn of the century. During this late
stage, Peirce sometimes appears to defend the legitimacy of intuition, as in his 1902 “The
Minute Logic”:
I strongly suspect that you hold reasoning to be superior to intuition or instinctive
uncritical processes of settling your opinions. What basis of fact is there for this
opinion? (CP 2.129)
26 At other times, he seems ambivalent about them, as can be seen in his 1910 “Definition”:
One of  the  old  Scotch psychologists,  whether  it  was  Dugald  Stewart  or  Reid  or
which other matters naught, mentions, as strikingly exhibiting the disparateness of
different senses, that a certain man blind from birth asked of a person of normal
vision whether the color scarlet was not something like the blare of a trumpet; and
the  philosopher  evidently  expects  his  readers  to  laugh  with  him  over  the
incongruity of the notion. But what he really illustrates much more strikingly is the
dullness  of  apprehension of  those  who,  like  himself,  had only  the  conventional
education  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  remained  wholly  uncultivated  in
comparing  ideas  that  in  their  matter  are  very  unlike.  For  everybody  who  has
acquired  the  degree  of  susceptibility  which  is  requisite  in  the  more  delicate
branches of reasoning – those kinds of reasoning which our Scotch psychologist
would have labelled “Intuitions” with a strong suspicion that they were delusions –
will  recognize at  once so decided a likeness between a luminous and extremely
chromatic scarlet, like that of the iodide of mercury as commonly sold under the
name of scarlet [and the blare of a trumpet] that I would almost hazard a guess that
the form of the chemical oscillations set up by this color in the observer will be
found to resemble that of the acoustical waves of the trumpet’s blare. (CP 1.312)
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27 What  explains  Peirce’s  varying  attitudes  on  the  nature  of  intuition,  given  that  he
decisively rejects the existence of intuitions in his early work? The answer, we think, can
be found in the different ways that Peirce discusses intuition after the 1860s. In the above
passage from “The Minute Logic,” for instance, Peirce portrays intuition as a kind of
“uncritical process” of settling opinions, one that is related to instinct. This also seems to
be  the  sense  under  consideration  in  the  1910  passage,  wherein  intuitions  might  be
misconstrued as delusions.  It  is  no surprise,  then, that Peirce would not consider an
uncritical method of settling opinions suitable for deriving truths in mathematics. It is
surprising, though, what Peirce says in his 1887 “A Guess at the Riddle”:
Intuition  is  the  regarding  of  the  abstract  in  a  concrete  form,  by  the  realistic
hypostatisation of relations; that is the one sole method of valuable thought. Very
shallow is the prevalent notion that this is something to be avoided. You might as
well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided because it has led to so much error;
quite in the same philistine line of thought would that be and so well in accord with
the spirit of nominalism that I wonder some one does not put it forward. The true
precept is not to abstain from hypostatisation, but to do it intelligently. (CP 1.383;
EP1: 262)
28 Far from being untrusting of intuition, Peirce here puts it on the same level as reasoning,
at least when it comes to being able to lead us to the truth. How can we reconcile the
claims made in this passage with those Peirce makes elsewhere?
29 Here is our proposal: taking seriously the nominal definition that Peirce later gives of
intuition as “uncritical processes of reasoning,”6 we can reconcile his earlier, primarily
negative claims with the later, more nuanced treatment by isolating different ways in
which “intuition” appears to be functioning in the passages that stand in tension with
one another. The solution to the interpretive puzzle turns on a disambiguation between
three related notions: intuition (in the sense of “first cognition”); instinct (which is often
implicated  in  “intuitive”  reasoning);  and  il  lume  naturale.  Once  we  disentangle  these
senses, we will be able to see that ways in which instinct and il lume naturale can fit into
the  process  of  inquiry  –  respectively,  by  promoting  the  growth  of  concrete
reasonableness and the maintenance of the epistemic attitude proper to inquiry.
 
“First Cognition”
30 The first  thing to  notice  is  that  what  Peirce  is  responding to  in  1868 is  explicitly  a
Cartesian account of  how knowledge is  acquired,  and that the piece of  the Cartesian
puzzle singled out as “intuition” – and upon which scorn is thereafter heaped – is not 
intuition in the sense of uncritical processes of reasoning. Intuition as “first cognition”
read through a Cartesian lens is more likely to be akin to clear and distinct apprehension
of  innate  ideas.  Given Peirce’s  thoroughgoing  empiricism,  it  is  unsurprising  that  we
should find him critical of intuition in that sense, which is not properly intuition at all.
But the complaint is not simply that the Cartesian picture is insufficiently empiricist –
which would be,  after  all,  mere  question-begging.  Classical  empiricists,  such as  John
Locke, attempt to shift the burden of proof by arguing that there is no reason to posit
innate ideas as part of the story of knowledge acquisition: “He that attentively considers
the state of a child, at his first coming into the world, will have little reason to think him
stored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge: It is by
degrees he comes to be furnished with them” (np.106). Locke goes on to argue that the
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ideas which appear to us as clear and distinct become so through our sustained attention
(np.107).
31 Peirce takes a different angle. Of the doctrine of innate ideas, he remarks that
The really unobjectionable word is innate; for that may be innate which is very
abstruse,  and  which  we  can  only  find  out  with  extreme  difficulty.  All  those
Cartesians who advocated innate ideas took this ground; and only Locke failed to
see that learning something from experience,  and having been fully aware of it
since birth, did not exhaust all possibilities. (CP 4.92)
32 As we shall  see when we turn to our discussion of instinct,  Peirce is unperturbed by
innate instincts playing a role in inquiry. What Descartes has critically missed out on in
focusing on the doctrine of clear and distinct perception associated with innate ideas is
the need for the pragmatic dimension of understanding. Peirce argues in “How to Make
Our Ideas Clear” that to understand a concept fully is not just to be able to grasp its
instances  and  give  it  an  analytic  definition  (what  the  dimensions  of  clarity  and
distinctness track), but also to be able to articulate the consequences of its appropriate
use. “We must look to the upshot of our concepts in order rightly to apprehend them”
(CP 5.3) – so, we cannot rightly apprehend a thing by a mode of cognition that operates
quite apart from the use of concepts, which is what Peirce takes first cognition to be. On
that understanding of what intuitions could be, we have no intuitions. 
33 On Peirce’s view, Descartes’ mistake is not to think that there is some innate element
operative in reasoning, but to think that innate ideas could be known with certainty
through purely mental perception. As he puts it:
It would be all very well to prefer an immediate instinctive judgment if there were
such a thing; but there is no such instinct. What is taken for such is nothing but
confused thought precisely along the line of the scientific analysis. It would be a
somewhat extreme position to prefer confused to distinct thought, especially when
one has only to listen to what the latter has to urge to find the former ready to
withdraw its contention in the mildest acquiescence. (CP 2.174)
34 Cognition of this kind is not to be had. But while rejecting the existence of intuition qua 
first  cognition,  Peirce  will  still  use  “intuition”  to  pick  out  that  uncritical  mode  of
reasoning.  Next  we will  see that  this  use of  “intuition” is  closely related to another
concept that Peirce employs frequently throughout his writings, namely instinct.
 
Instinct
35 At first pass, examining Peirce’s views on instinct does not seem particularly helpful in
making sense of his view of common sense,  since his references to ‘instinct’  are also
heterogeneous. But it is not altogether surprising that more than one thing is present
under the umbrella of ‘instinct,’ nor is it so difficult to rule out the senses of ‘instinct’ that
are not relevant to common sense. More interesting are the cases of instinct that are very
sophisticated, such as cuckoo birds hiding their eggs in the nests of other birds, and the
eusocial behaviour of bees and ants (CP 2.176). 
36 Peirce’s commitment to evolutionary theory shines through in his articulation of the
relation  of  reason  and  instinct  in  “Reasoning  and  the  Logic  of  Things,”  where  he
recommends that “we should chiefly depend not upon that department of the soul which
is most superficial and fallible, – I mean our reason, – but upon that department that is
deep and sure, – which is instinct” (RLT 121). Instinct is more basic than reason, in the
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sense of more deeply embedded in our nature, as our sharing it with other living sentient
creatures suggests. Reason, having arisen later and less commonly, has not had the long
trial that instinct has successfully endured. This is why when the going gets tough, Peirce
believes that instinct should take over: “reason, for all the frills it customarily wears, in
vital crises, comes down upon its marrow-bones to beg the succor of instinct” (RLT 111).
37 Instinct is basic, but that does not mean that all instincts are “base,” or on the order of
animal urges. In fact, Peirce is clear in stating that he believes the word “instinct” can
refer equally well to an inborn disposition expressed as a habit or an acquired habit. As he
puts it, “since it is difficult to make sure whether a habit is inherited or is due to infantile
training and tradition, I shall ask leave to employ the word ‘instinct’ to cover both cases”
(CP 2.170). Peirce is not being vague about there being two such cases here, but rather
noting the epistemic difficulty: there are sentiments that we have always had and always
habitually expressed, so far as we can tell, but whether they are rooted in instinct or in
training is difficult to discern.7 
38 Despite their origins being difficult to ascertain, Peirce sets out criteria for instinct as
conscious.  To his  definition of  instinct  as  inherited or developed habit,  he adds that
instincts are conscious, determined in some way toward an end (what he refers to a quasi-
purpose), and capable of being refined by training. This set of features helps us to see how
it is that reason can refine common sense qua instinctual response, and how common
sense – insofar as it  is rooted in instinct – can be capable of refinement at all.  Such
refinement takes the form of being “controlled by the deliberate exercise of imagination
and  reflection”  (CP  7.381).  Habits,  being  open  to  calibration  and  correction,  can  be
refined.  It  is  because instincts  are  habitual  in  nature that  they are amenable  to  the
intervention of reason.
39 Along with discussing sophisticated cases of instinct and its general features, Peirce also
undertakes  a  classification  of  the  instincts.  Richard  Atkins  has  carefully  traced  the
development of this classification, which unfolds alongside Peirce’s continual work on the
classification of the sciences – a project which did not reach its mature form until after
the turn of the century. According to Atkins, Peirce may have explicitly undertaken the
classification of the instincts to help to classify practical sciences (Atkins 2016: 55). This
makes sense; the practical sciences target conduct in a variety of arenas, where being
governed  by  an  appropriate  instinct  may  be  requisite  to  performing  well.  Peirce’s
classificatory scheme is triadic, presenting the categories of suicultual, civicultural, and
specicultural  instincts.  The  suicultual  are  those  focused  on  the  preservation  and
flourishing of one’s self, while the civicultural support the preservation and flourishing of
one’s family or kin group. 
40 For our investigation, the most important are the specicultural instincts, which concern
the preservation and flourishing not of individuals or groups, but of ideas. Of these, the
most interesting in the context of common sense are the grouping, graphic, and gnostic
instincts.8 The grouping instinct is an instinct for association, for bringing things or ideas
together in salient groupings (R1343; Atkins 2016: 62). Given Peirce’s interest in generals,
this instinct must be operative in inquiry to the extent that truth-seeking is seeking the
most  generalizable  indefeasible  claims.  It  is  also  clear  that  its  exercise  can  at  least
sometimes involve conscious  activity,  as  it  is  the interpretive element  present  in all
experience that pushes us past the “thisness” of an object and its experiential immediacy,
toward judgment and information of use to our community.
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41 The graphic instinct is “a disposition to work energetically with ideas,” to “wake them
up” (R 1343; Atkins 2016: 62). This connects with a tantalizing remark made elsewhere in
Peirce’s more general classification of the sciences, where he claims that some ideas are
so important that they take on a life of their own and move through generations – ideas
such  as  “truth”  and  “right.”  Such  ideas,  when  woken  up,  have  what  Peirce  called
“generative life” (CP 1.219).  When we consider the frequently realist character of so-
called folk philosophical theories, we do see that standards of truth and right are often
understood as constitutive.
42 The gnostic instinct is perhaps most directly implicated in the conversation about reason
and common sense. In one place, Peirce presents it simply as “curiosity” (CP 7.58). In
Atkins’ words, the gnostic instinct “is an instinct to look beyond ideas to their upshot and
purpose, which is the truth” (Atkins 2016: 62). That way of putting it demonstrates the
gap between the idea of first cognition and what Peirce believes is necessary for truly
understanding a concept – it is the gnostic instinct that moves us toward the pragmatic
dimension.
43 All three of these instincts Peirce regards as conscious, purposive, and trainable, and all
three might be thought of as guiding or supporting the instinctual use of our intelligence.
But they are not the full story. Although instinct clearly has a place in the life of reason, it
also has a limit. As he remarks in the incomplete “Minute Logic”:
[…] [F]ortunately (I say it advisedly) man is not so happy as to be provided with a
full stock of instincts to meet all occasions, and so is forced upon the adventurous
business of reasoning, where the many meet shipwreck and the few find, not old-
fashioned happiness, but its splendid substitute, success. When one’s purpose lies in
the line of novelty, invention, generalization, theory – in a word, improvement of
the situation – by the side of which happiness appears a shabby old dud – instinct
and the rule of thumb manifestly cease to be applicable. The best plan, then, on the
whole,  is  to base our conduct as much as possible on Instinct,  but when we do
reason to reason with severely scientific logic. (CP 2.178)
44 Novelty, invention, generalization, theory – all gathered together as ways of improving
the situation – require the successful adventure of reasoning well. As such, our attempts
to  improve  our  conduct  and  our  situations  will  move  through  cycles  of  instinctual
response and adventure in reasoning, with the latter helping to refine and calibrate the
former.
45 In addition to there being situations where instinct simply runs out – Cornelius de Waal
suggests that there are cases where instinct has produced governing sentiments that we
now find odious, cases where our instinctual natures can produce conflicting intuitions or
totally  inadequate  intuitions9 –  instinct  in  at  least  some  sense  must  be  left  at  the
laboratory door. For better or worse,10 Peirce maintains a distinction between theory and
practice such that what he is willing to say of instinct in the practice of practical sciences
is not echoed in his discussion of the theoretical:
I  would not allow to sentiment or instinct any weight whatsoever in theoretical
matters, not the slightest. Right sentiment does not demand any such weight; and
right reason would emphatically repudiate the claim if it were made. True, we are
driven oftentimes in  science to  try  the suggestions  of  instinct;  but  we only  try
them, we compare them with experience, we hold ourselves ready to throw them
overboard  at  a  moment’s  notice  from  experience.  If  I  allow  the  supremacy  of
sentiment in human affairs, I do so at the dictation of reason itself; and equally at
the dictation of sentiment, in theoretical matters I refuse to allow sentiment any
weight whatever. (CP 1. 634)
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46 Instinct, or sentiment rooted in instinct, can serve as the supreme guide in everyday
human affairs and on some scientific occasions as the groundswell of hypotheses. Right 
sentiment seeks no other role, and does not overstep its boundaries.
47 But there is a more robust sense of ‘instinct’  that goes beyond what happens around
theoretical matters or at their points of origin, and can infiltrate inquiry itself – which is
allowed in the laboratory door. That sense is what Peirce calls il lume naturale.
 
Il Lume Naturale
48 While Peirce’s views about the appropriateness of relying on intuition and instinct in
inquiry  will  vary,  there  is  another  related  concept  –  il  lume  naturale  –  which Peirce
consistently presents as appropriate to rely on. Peirce makes reference to il lume naturale
throughout  all  periods  of  his  writing,  although  somewhat  sparsely.  This  is  perhaps
surprising, first, because talking about reasoning by appealing to one’s “natural light”
certainly sounds like an appeal kind of intuition or instinct, so that it is strange that
Peirce should consistently hold it in high regard; and second, because performing inquiry
by appealing to il lume naturale sounds similar to a method of fixing beliefs that Peirce is
adamantly  against,  namely  the  method  of  the  a  priori.  Indeed,  the  catalyst  for  his
arguments in “The Fixation of Belief” stems from an apparent disillusionment with what
Peirce saw as a dominant method of reasoning from early scientists, namely the appeal to
an “interior illumination”: he describes Roger Bacon’s reasoning derisively, for example,
when  he  says  that  Bacon  thought  that  the  best  kind  of  experience  was  that  which
“teaches many things about Nature which the external senses could never discover, such
as the transubstantiation of bread” (EP1: 110). Peirce argues that later scientists have
improved their methods by turning to the world for confirmation of their experience, but
he is explicit that reasoning solely by the light of one’s own interior is a poor substitute
for  the  illumination  of  experience  from  the  world,  the  former  being  dictated  by
intellectual fads and personal taste.
49 To figure out what’s going on here we need to look in more detail at what, exactly, Peirce
thought “il lume naturale” referred to, and how it differed from other similar concepts like
instinct and intuition. The best way to make sense of Peirce’s view of il lume naturale, we
argue,  is  as  a  particular  kind  of  instinct,  one  that  is  connected  to  the  world  in  an
important way.
50 Passages  that  contain  discussions  of  il  lume  naturale will,  almost  invariably,  make
reference to Galileo.11 In Peirce’s 1891 “The Architecture of Theories,” for example, he
praises Galileo’s development of dynamics while at the same time noting that,
A modern physicist  on examining Galileo’s  works is  surprised to find how little
experiment had to do with the establishment of the foundations of mechanics. His
principal appeal is to common sense and il lume naturale. (CP 6.10, EP1: 287)
51 Here,  Peirce  argues  that  not  only  are  such appeals  –  at  least  in  Galileo’s  case  –  an
acceptable way of furthering scientific inquiry, but that they are actually necessary to do
so. This becomes apparent in his 1898 “The First Rule of Logic,” where Peirce argues that
induction on the basis of facts can only take our reasoning so far:
The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the universe has to teach
it. In Induction it simply surrenders itself to the force of facts. But it finds, at once
[…] it finds I say that this is not enough. It is driven in desperation to call upon its
inward sympathy with nature, its instinct for aid, just as we find Galileo at the dawn
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of modern science making his appeal to il lume naturale. But in so far as it does this,
the solid ground of fact fails it. It feels from that moment that its position is only
provisional. It must then find confirmations or else shift its footing. Even if it does
find confirmations, they are only partial. It still is not standing upon the bedrock of
fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the
present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way. (CP 5.589)
52 Peirce argues for the same idea in a short passage from 1896:
In examining the reasonings of those physicists who gave to modern science the
initial propulsion which has insured its healthful life ever since, we are struck with
the  great,  though  not  absolutely  decisive,  weight  they  allowed  to  instinctive
judgments.  Galileo  appeals  to  il  lume  naturale at  the  most  critical  stages  of  his
reasoning. Kepler, Gilbert, and Harvey – not to speak of Copernicus – substantially
rely  upon an  inward power,  not  sufficient  to  reach the  truth  by  itself,  but  yet
supplying an essential factor to the influences carrying their minds to the truth.
It is certain that the only hope of retroductive reasoning ever reaching the truth is
that there may be some natural tendency toward an agreement between the ideas
which suggest themselves to the human mind and those which are concerned in the
laws of nature. (CP 1.80)
53 In these passages, Peirce is arguing that in at least some cases, reasoning has to appeal at
some point to something like il lume naturale in order for there to be scientific progress. In
the  above  passage  we  see  a  potential  reason  why:  one  could  reach  any  number  of
conclusions on the basis of a set of evidence through retroductive reasoning, so in order
to decide which of these conclusions one ought to reach, one then needs to appeal to
something beyond the evidence itself. Similarly, in the passage from “The First Rule of
Logic,” Peirce claims that inductive reasoning faces the same requirement: on the basis of
a set of evidence there are many possible conclusions that one could reach as a result of
induction, and so we need some other court of appeal for induction to work at all.
54 Note here that we have so far been discussing a role that Peirce saw il  lume naturale
playing for inquiry in the realm of science. Peirce does, however, make reference to il
lume naturale as it pertains to vital matters, as well. Consider, for example, the following
passage from “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life” (1898):
Reasoning is of three kinds. The first is necessary, but it only professes to give us
information concerning the matter of our own hypotheses and distinctly declares
that, if we want to know anything else, we must go elsewhere. The second depends
upon probabilities. The only cases in which it pretends to be of value is where we
have,  like  an  insurance  company,  an  endless  multitude  of  insignificant  risks.
Wherever a vital interest is at stake, it clearly says, “Don’t ask me.” The third kind
of reasoning tries what il lume naturale, which lit the footsteps of Galileo, can do. It
is really an appeal to instinct. Thus reason, for all the frills it customarily wears, in
vital crises, comes down upon its marrow-bones to beg the succour of instinct. (RLT
111)
55 However,  as  we  have  already  seen  in  the  above  passages,  begging  “the  succour  of
instinct” is not a practice exclusive to reasoning about vital matters. At least at the time
of  “Philosophy  and  the  Conduct  of  Life,”  though,  Peirce  is  attempting  to  make  a
distinction between inquiry into scientific and vital matters by arguing that we have no
choice but to rely on instinct in the case of the latter. But if induction and retroduction
both require an appeal to il  lume naturale,  then why should Peirce think that there is
really any important difference between the two areas of inquiry?
56 We think we can make sense of this puzzle by making a distinction that Peirce is himself
not always careful in making, namely that between il lume naturale and instinct. As we
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have  seen,  Peirce  is  more  often skeptical  when it  comes  to  appealing  to  instinct  in
inquiry, arguing that it is something that we ought to verify with experience, since it is
something that we do not have any explicit reason to think will lead us to the truth.
Peirce argues that il lume naturale, however, is more likely to lead us to the truth because
those cognitions that come as the result of such seemingly natural light are both about
the world and produced by the world. Consider how Peirce conceives of the role of il lume
naturale as guiding Galileo in his development of the laws of dynamics, again from “The
Architecture of Theories”:
For instance, a body left to its own inertia moves in a straight line, and a straight
line appears to us the simplest of curves. In itself, no curve is simpler than another
[…] But the straight line appears to us simple, because, as Euclid says, it lies evenly
between its extremities; that is, because viewed endwise it appears as a point. That
is, again, because light moves in straight lines. Now, light moves in straight lines
because of the part which the straight line plays in the laws of dynamics. Thus it is
that, our minds having been formed under the influence of phenomena governed by the laws
of mechanics, certain conceptions entering into those laws become implanted in our minds,
so that we readily guess at what the laws are. Without such a natural prompting, having
to  search  blindfold  for  a  law  which  would  suit  the  phenomena,  our  chance  of
finding it  would be as one to infinity.  The further physical  studies depart  from
phenomena which have directly influenced the growth of the mind, the less we can
expect to find the laws which govern them “simple,” that is, composed of a few
conceptions natural to our minds. (CP 6.10, emphasis ours)
57 Our minds, then, have been formed by natural processes, processes which themselves
dictate  the  relevant  laws  that  those  like  Euclid  and Galileo  were  able  to  discern  by
appealing to the natural light. This means that il lume naturale does not constitute any
kind of special faculty that is possessed only by great scientists like Galileo. Indeed, that
those like Galileo were able to appeal to il lume naturale with such success pertained to the
nature of the subject matter he studied: that the ways in which our minds were formed
were dictated by the laws of mechanics gives us reason to think that our common sense
beliefs regarding those laws are likely to be true.
58 In thinking about il  lume naturale in this way, though, Peirce walks a thin line. While
Galileo may have gotten things right, there is no guarantee that by appealing to my own
natural light, or what I take to be the natural light, that I will similarly be led to true
beliefs.  Furthermore,  justifying  such  beliefs  by  appealing  to  an  apparent  connection
between the way that the world is and the way that my inner light guides me can lead us
to lend credence to beliefs that perhaps do not deserve it. We can, however, now see the
relationship between instinct and il lume naturale. As we have seen, instinct is not of much
use  when  it  comes  to  making  novel  arguments  or  advancing  inquiry  into  complex
scientific  logic.12 We  have  also  seen  in  our  discussion  of  instinct  that  instincts  are
malleable and liable to change over time. When these instincts evolve in response to
changes produced in us by nature, then, we are then dealing with il lume naturale.
59 So far we have unpacked four related concepts: common sense, intuition, instinct, and il
lume  naturale.  We have seen that  Peirce  is  not  always  consistent  in  his  use  of  these
concepts, nor is he always careful in distinguishing them from one another. That being
said, now that we have untangled some of the most significant interpretive knots we can
return  to  the  puzzle  with  which  we  started  and  say  something  about  the  role  that
common sense plays in Peirce’s philosophy.
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Common Sense, Take 2: The Growth of Concrete
Reasonableness
60 As  a  practicing  scientist  and  logician,  it  is  unsurprising  that  Peirce  has  rigorous
expectations for method in philosophy. Although many parts of his philosophical system
remain in motion for decades, his commitment to inquiry as “laboratory philosophy”
requiring the experimental mindset never wavers. Yet it is now quite clear that intuition,
carefully disambiguated, plays important roles in the life of a cognitive agent. Instinct
and il lume naturale as we have understood them emerging in Peirce’s writings over time
both play a role specifically in inquiry – the domain of reason – and in the exercise and
systematization of common sense.
61 Our most basic instincts steer us smoothly when there are no doubts and there should be
no doubts,  thus saving us from ill-motivated inquiry.  Our instincts that are specially
tuned to reasoning – concerning association, giving life to ideas, and seeking the truth –
suggest that our lives are really doxastic lives.  But that this is so does not mean, on
Peirce’s  view,  that  we  are  constantly  embroiled  in  theoretical  enterprise.  Quite  the
opposite:
For the most part, theories do little or nothing for everyday business. Nobody fit to
be at large would recommend a carpenter who had to put up a pigsty or an ordinary
cottage  to  make  an  engineer’s  statical  diagram  of  the  structure.  In  particular,
applications of theories would be worse than useless where they would interfere
with  the  operation  of  trained  instincts.  Who  could  play  billiards  by  analytic
mechanics? We all have a natural instinct for right reasoning, which, within the
special  business of  each of  us,  has received a severe training by its  conclusions
being constantly brought into comparison with experiential results. Nay, we not
only have a reasoning instinct, but […] we have an instinctive theory of reasoning,
which  gets  corrected  in  the  course  of  our  experience.  So,  it  would  be  most
unreasonable to demand that the study of logic should supply an artificial method
of doing the thinking that his regular business requires every man daily to do. (CP
2.3)
62 Common sense systematized is a knowledge conservation mechanism: it tells us what we
should not doubt, for some doubts are paper and not to be taken seriously. There are
times, when the sceptic comes calling, to simply sit back and keep your powder dry.
63 This is perfectly consistent with the inquirer’s status as a bog walker, where every step is
provisional – for beliefs are not immune to revision on the basis of their common-sense
designation,  but  rather  on the  basis  of  their  performance  in  the  wild.  Even deeper,
instincts are not immune to revision, but are similarly open to calibration and correction
– to being refined or resisted. Just as we want our beliefs to stand up, but are open to the
possibility  that  they may not,  the same is  true of  the instincts  that  guide us  in our
practical lives – which are nonetheless the lives of generalizers, legislators, and would-be
truth-seekers. In both belief and instinct, we seek to be concretely reasonable. Thus, the
epistemic stance that Peirce commends us to is a mixture: a blend of what is new in our
natures, the remarkable intelligence of human beings, and of what is old, the instincts
that tell their own story of our evolution toward rationality. For instance, what Peirce
calls the “abductive instinct” is the source of creativity in science, of the generation of
hypotheses. What he recommends to us is also a blended stance, an epistemic attitude
holding together conservatism and fallibilism.
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64 Thus, we arrive at one upshot of considering Peirce’s account of common sense, namely
that we can better appreciate why he is with it “in the main.” Common sense calls us to
an epistemic attitude balancing conservatism and fallbilism, which is best for balancing
our theoretical pursuits and our workaday affairs.  The process of unpacking much of
what Peirce had to say on the related notions of first cognition,  instinct,  and il  lume
naturale motivate us to close by extending this attitude in a metaphilosophical way, and
into the 21st century. We now turn to intuitions and common sense in contemporary
metaphilosophy, where we suggest that a Peircean intervention could prove illuminating.
 
The Take-Home: Grounded Intuitions 
65 Peirce’s discussions of common sense and the related concepts of intuition and instinct
are not of solely historical interest, especially given the recent resurgence in the interest
of  the  role  of  the  intuitive  in  philosophy.  These  are  currently  two  main  questions
addressed in contemporary metaphilosophical debates: a descriptive question, which asks
whether  intuitions  do,  in  fact,  play  a  role  in  philosophical  inquiry,  and  a  normative
question, which asks what role intuitions ought to play a role in such inquiry. As we will
see, the contemporary metaphilosophical questions are of a kind with the questions that
Peirce was concerned with in terms of the role of common sense and the intuitive in
inquiry generally;  both ask when, if  at all,  we should trust the intuitive. In this final
section we will consider some of the main answers to these questions, and argue that
Peirce’s views can contribute to the relevant debates.
66 That philosophers will at least sometimes appeal to intuitions in their arguments seems
close to a truism. However, there have recently been a number of arguments that, despite
appearances, philosophers do not actually rely on intuitions in philosophical inquiry at
all. Herman Cappellen (2012) is perhaps the most prominent proponent of such a view: he
argues that while philosophers will often write as if they are appealing to intuitions in
support  of  their  arguments,  such  appeals  are  merely  linguistic  hedges.  Most  other
treatments of the question do not ask whether philosophers appeal to intuitions at all, but
whether philosophers treat intuitions as evidence for or against a particular theory. Max
Deutsch (2015), for example, answers this latter question in the negative, arguing that
philosophers do not rely on intuitions as evidential support; Jonathan Ichikawa (2014)
similarly argues that while intuitions play some role in philosophical inquiry, it is the
propositions  that  are  intuited  that  are  treated  as  evidence,  and  not  the  intuitions
themselves.  On the other side of  the debate there have been a number of  responses
targeting the kinds  of  negative  descriptive  arguments  made by the above and other
authors.  Nevin  Climenhaga  (forthcoming),  for  example,  defends  the  view  that
philosophers  treat  intuitions  as  evidence,  citing  the  facts  that  philosophers  tend  to
believe what they find intuitive, that they offer error-theories in attempts to explain
away intuitions that conflict with their arguments, and that philosophers tend to increase
their confidence in their views depending on the range of intuitions that support them.
Richard Boyd (1988) has suggested that intuitions may be a species of trained judgment
whose nature is between perceptual judgment and deliberate inference.
67 How might Peirce weigh in on the descriptive question? As we have seen, the answer to
this question is not straightforward, given the various ways in which Peirce treated the
notion of  the intuitive.  In the sense of  “intuition” used as “first  cognition” Peirce is
adamant that no such thing exists, and thus in this sense Peirce would no doubt answer
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the descriptive question in the negative. We have also seen that what qualifies as the
intuitive  for  Peirce  is  much  more  wide-ranging.  If  we  take  what  contemporary
philosophers thinks of as intuition to also include instinct, il lume naturale, and common
sense, then Peirce holds the mainstream metaphilosophical view that intuitions do play a
role in inquiry.
68 If philosophers do, in fact, rely on intuitions in philosophical inquiry, ought they to do so?
We have seen that this normative problem is one that was frequently on Peirce’s mind, as
is  exemplified  in  his  apparent  ambivalence  over  the use  of  the  intuitive  in  inquiry.
Recently, there have been many worries raised with regards to philosophers’ reliance on
intuitions. Carrie Jenkins (2014) summarizes some of the key problems as follows:
(1) The nature, workings, target(s) and/or source(s) of intuitions are unclear.
(2) Why should we think intuitions are reliable, epistemically trustworthy, a source of
evidence, etc.?
(3) Intuitions exhibit cultural variation/intra-personal instability/inter-personal clashes.
(4) There is no way to calibrate intuitions against anything else.
(5) It is not naturalistically respectable to give epistemic weight to intuitions.
69 Peirce raises a number of these concerns explicitly in his writings. He raises issues similar
to (1) throughout his “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties,” where he argues that we
are unable to distinguish what we take to be intuitive from what we take to be the result
of processes of reasoning. As Peirce thinks that we are, at least sometimes, unable to
correctly identify our intuitions, it will be difficult to identify their nature. We have seen
that he has question (2) in mind throughout his writing on the intuitive, and how his
ambivalence on the right way to answer it created a number of interpretive puzzles. In
general,  though,  the  view  that  the  intuitive needs  to  be  somehow  verified  by  the
empirical is a refrain that shows up in many places throughout Peirce’s work, and thus
we get the view that much of the intuitive, if it is to be trusted at all, is only trustworthy
insofar as it is confirmed by experience. Peirce raises worry (3) most explicitly in his
“Fixation  of  Belief”  when  he  challenges  the  method  of  the  a  priori:  that  reasoning
according to such a  method is  not  a  good method for fixing beliefs  is  because such
reasoning relies on what one finds intuitive, which is in turn influenced by what one has
been taught or what is popular to think at the time.
70 It  is  less  clear  whether  Peirce  thinks  that  the  intuitive  can  be  calibrated.  The
metaphilosophical worry here is that while we recognize that our intuitions sometimes
lead us to the truth and sometimes lead us astray, there is no obvious way in which we
can attempt to hone our intuitions so that they do more of the former than the latter.
That our instincts evolve and change over time implies that the intuitive, for Peirce, is
capable of improving, and so it might, so to speak, self-calibrate insofar as false intuitive
judgements  will  get  weeded  out  over  time.  When  it  comes  to  individual  inquiries,
however, it’s not clear whether our intuitions can actually be improved, instead of merely
checked  up  on.13 While  Peirce  seemed  skeptical  of  the  possibility  of  calibrating  the
intuitive when it came to matters such as “scientific logic,” there nevertheless did seem
to be some other matters about which our intuitions come pre-calibrated, namely those
produced in us by nature.  Because such intuitions are provided to us by nature,  and
because that class of the intuitive has shown to lead us to the truth when applied in the
right  domains  of  inquiry,  Peirce will  disagree  with  (5):  it  is,  at  least  sometimes,
naturalistically appropriate to give epistemic weight to intuitions.
Peirce on Intuition, Instinct, & Common Sense
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
17
71 How, then, might Peirce answer the normative question generally? To get an idea it is
perhaps most illustrative to look back at Peirce’s discussion of il lume naturale. As we saw
above, il  lume naturale is a source of truths because we have reason to believe that it
produces  intuitive  beliefs  about  the  world  in  the  right  way:  as  beings  of  the  world
ourselves, we are caused to believe facts about the world in virtue of the way that the
world  actually  is.  The  natural  light,  then,  is one  that  is  provided  by  nature,  and  is
reflective of nature. Call intuitive beliefs that result from this kind of process grounded:
their content is about facts of the world, and they come about as a result of the way in
which the world actually is.14 Il lume naturale represents one source of grounded intuitions
for Peirce. But we can also see that instincts and common sense can be grounded for
Peirce, as well.
72 Consider, for example, how Peirce discusses the conditions under which it is appropriate
to rely on instinct: in his “Ten Pre-Logical Opinions,” the fifth is that we have the opinion
that reason is superior to instinct and intuition. Peirce argues that this clearly is not
always the case: there are times at which we rely on our instincts and they seem to lead
us to the truth, and times at which our reasoning actually gets in our way, such that we
are lead away from what our instinct was telling us was right the whole time. There are of
course other times at which our instincts and intuitions can lead us very much astray,
and in which we need to rely on reasoning to get back on track. Peirce seems to think that
the cases in which we should rely on our instincts are those instances of decision making
that have to do with the everyday banalities of life. On the other hand,
When one’s purpose lies in the line of novelty, invention, generalization, theory – in
a word, improvement of the situation – by the side of which happiness appears a
shabby old dud – instinct and the rule of thumb manifestly cease to be applicable.
(CP 2.178)
73 Peirce is fond of comparing the instincts that people have to those possessed by other
animals: bees, for example, rely on instinct to great success, so why not think that people
could do the same? That the instinct of bees should lead them to success is no doubt the
product of their nature: evolution has guided their development in such a way to be
responsive to their environment in a way that allows them to thrive. Of course, bees are
not  trying to develop complex theories  about  the nature of  the world,  nor are they
engaged in any reasoning about scientific logic, and are presumably devoid of intellectual
curiosity. We have seen that when it comes to novel arguments, complex mathematics,
etc., Peirce argues that instinct is not well-suited to such pursuits precisely because we
lack the “full stock of instincts” that one would need to employ in new situations and
when thinking about new problems. This is not to say that we lack any kind of instinct or
intuition when it comes to these matters; it is, however, in these more complex matters
where instinct and intuition lead us astray – in which they fail to be grounded – and in
which reasoning must take over.
74 Peirce is not alone in his view that we have some intuitive beliefs that are grounded, and
thereby trustworthy. Consider, for, example, a view from Ernst Mach:
Everything which we observe imprints itself uncomprehended and unanalyzed in our
percepts and ideas, which then, in their turn, mimic the process of nature in their
most  general  and  most  striking  features.  In  these  accumulated  experiences  we
possess a treasure-store which is ever close at hand, and of which only the smallest
portion is  embodied in  clear  articulate  thought.  The circumstance that  it  is  far
easier to resort to these experiences than it is to nature herself, and that they are,
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notwithstanding  this,  free,  in  the  sense  indicated,  from  all  subjectivity,  invests
them with high value. (Mach 1960 [1883]: 36) 
75 It  is  not clear that Peirce would agree with Mach that such ideas are free from “all
subjectivity”; nevertheless, the kinds of ideas that Mach discusses are similar to those
which  Peirce  discusses  as  examples  of  being  grounded:  the  source  of  that  which  is
intuitive and grounded is the way the world is, and thus is trustworthy. Jenkins (2008)
presents a much more recent version of a similar view. She considers why intuition might
be trustworthy when it comes specifically to mathematical reasoning:
Our concepts are representations of the world; as such, they can serve as a kind of
map of that world. Examining this conceptual map can – and probably often does –
amount to thinking about the world and not about these representations of it. In
doing conceptual examination we are allowing our concepts to guide us, but we
need not be aware that they are what is guiding us in order to count as performing
an examination of them in my intended sense […] By way of filling in the rest of the
story, I want to suggest that, if our concepts are somehow sensitive to the way the
independent world is, so that they successfully and accurately represent that world,
then an examination of them may not merely be an examination of ourselves, but
may rather amount to an examination of an accurate, on-board conceptual map of
the independent world. And I want to suggest that we might well be able to acquire
knowledge about the independent world by examining such a map. (Jenkins 2008:
124-6)
76 Jenkins suggests that our intuitions can be a source of truths about the world because
they are related to the world in the same way in which a map is related to part of the
world that it is meant to represent. Importantly for Jenkins, reading a map does not tell
us something just about the map itself: in her example, looking at a map of England can
tell us both what the map represents as being the distance from one city to another, as
well as how far the two cities are actually apart. Intuitions are psychological entities, but
by appealing to grounded intuitions, we do not merely appeal to some facts about our
psychology, but to facts about the actual world.
77 Thus, on our reading, Peirce maintains that there is some class of the intuitive that can,
in fact, lead us to the truth, namely those grounded intuitions. Do grounded intuitions
thus exhibit a kind of epistemic priority as defended by Reid, such that they have positive
epistemic status in virtue of being grounded? Peirce’s comments on il lume naturale and
instincts provided by nature do indeed sound similar to Reid’s view that common sense
judgments are justified prior to scrutiny because they are the product of reliable sources.
However, that grounded intuitions for Peirce are truth-conducive does not entail that
they have any kind of epistemic priority in Reid’s sense. Again, since we are unable to tell
just by introspection whether our judgments are the products of instinct, intuition, or
reasoning, and since the dictates of common sense and its related concepts are malleable
and evolve over time, Peirce cannot take an intuitive judgment to be, by itself, justified.
Instead, grounded intuitions are the class of the intuitive that will survive the scrutiny
generated by genuine doubt.
78 However, that there is a category of the intuitive that is plausibly trustworthy does not
solve  all  of  the  problems  that  we  faced  when  considering  the  role  of  intuitions  in
philosophical discourse. Consider, for example, two maps that disagree about the distance
between two cities. On the basis of the maps alone there is no way to tell which one is
actually correct; nor is there any way to become better at identifying correct maps in the
future, provided we figure out which one is actually right in this particular instance.
General  worries  about  calibration  will  therefore  persist.  There  is,  however,  another
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response to the normative problem that Peirce can provide – one that we think is unique,
given Peirce’s view of the nature of inquiry.
79 The  contemporary  normative  question  is  really  two  questions:  “ought  the  fact  that
something is intuitive be considered evidence that a given view is true or false?” and “is
the content  of  our  intuitions  likely  to  be true?” In contemporary debates  these two
questions are treated as one: if intuitions are not generally truth-conducive it does not
seem like we ought to treat them as evidence, and if we ought to treat them as evidence
then it seems that we ought to do so just because they are truth-conducive. But these
questions can come apart for Peirce, given his views of the nature of inquiry. This is
because for Peirce inquiry is a process of fixing beliefs to resolve doubt. What creates
doubt, though, does not need to have a rational basis, nor generally be truth-conducive in
order for it to motivate inquiry: as long as the doubt is genuine, it is something that we
ought to try to resolve. 
80 One potential  source  of  doubt  is  our  intuitions  themselves:  that  a  given theory  has
counterintuitive consequences is taken to be a reason to question that theory, as well as
motivating us to either find a new theory without such consequences, or else to provide
an error theory to explain why we might have the intuitions that we do without giving up
the  theory.  But  intuitions  can  play  a  dialectical  role  without  thereby  playing  a
corresponding evidential role: that we doubt whether p is true is not necessarily evidence
that p is not true. That something can motivate our inquiry into p without being evidence
for or against that p is a product of Peirce’s view of inquiry according to which genuine
doubt, regardless of its source, ought to be taken seriously in inquiry. We have, then, a
second answer to the normative question: we ought to take the intuitive seriously when it
is a source of genuine doubt. While the contemporary debate is concerned primarily with
whether we ought epistemically to rely on intuitions in philosophical inquiry, according
to Peirce there is a separate sense in which their capacity to generate doubt means that
we ought methodologically to be motivated by intuitions.
 
Conclusion
81 We started with a puzzle: Peirce both states his allegiance to the person who contents
themselves with common sense and insists that common sense ought not have any role to
play in many areas of inquiry. We have seen that this ambivalence arises numerous times,
in various forms: Peirce calls himself a critical common-sensist, but does not ascribe to
common sense the epistemic or methodological priority that Reid does; we can rely on
common sense when it  comes to everyday matters,  but not  when doing complicated
science, except when it helps us with induction or retroduction; uncritical instincts and
intuitions lead us to the truth just as often as reasoning does, but there are no cognitions
that  have  positive  epistemic  status  without  having  survived  scrutiny;  and  so  forth.
Indeed, this ambivalence is reflective of a fundamental tension in Peirce’s epistemology,
one that exists between the need to be a fallibilist and anti-skeptic simultaneously: we
need something like common sense, the intuitive, or the instinctual to help us get inquiry
going in the first place, all while recognizing that any or all of our assumptions could be
shown  to  be  false  at  a  moment’s  notice.  We  have  shown  that  this  problem  has  a
contemporary analogue in the form of the metaphilosophical debate concerning reliance
on intuitions: how can we reconcile the need to rely on the intuitive while at the same
time realizing that our intuitions are highly fallible?
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82 While we are necessarily bog-walkers according to Peirce, it is not as though we navigate
the bog blindly. Experience is no doubt our primary guide, but common sense, intuition,
and instinct also play a role, especially when it comes to mundane, uncreative matters.
We have argued that Peirce held that the class of the intuitive that is likely to lead us to
the truth is that which is grounded, namely those cognitions that are about and produced
by the world, those cognitions given to us by nature. 
83 What we can extract  from this  investigation is  a  way of  understanding the Peircean
pragmatist’s distinctive take on our epistemic position, which is both fallibilist as inquirer
and commonsensically  anti-sceptical.  In light  of  the important  distinction implicit  in
Peirce’s  writings between intuition,  instinct,  and il  lume naturale,  here developed and
made explicit, we conclude that a philosopher with the laboratory mindset can endorse
common sense and ground her intuitions responsibly.
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NOTES
1. Peirce also occasionally discusses Dugald Steward and William Hamilton, but Reid is his main
stalking horse.
2. As we shall  see,  Peirce’s  discussion of  this  difficulty puts his  views in direct  contact  with
contemporary  metaphilosophical  debates  concerning  intuition.  We  return  to  this  point  of
contact in our “Take Home” section.
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3. See, for example, Atkins 2016, Bergman 2010, Migotti 2005.
4. Although Peirce was once again in very dire straits, as he had been in 1898, the subject matter
of the later lectures cannot be interpreted as a bad-tempered response to James – though they do
offer a number of disambiguations between James’ pragmatism and Peirce’s pragmaticism. Heney
2014 has argued, following Turrisi 1997 (ed. Peirce), that the Harvard lectures are a critical text
for the history of American philosophy.
5. Regarding James’ best-known account of what is permissible in the way of belief formation,
Peirce  wrote  the  following  directly  to  James:  “I  thought  your  Will  to  Believe  was  a  very
exaggerated utterance, such as injures a serious man very much” (CWJ 12: 171; 1909). A key part
of James’ position is that doxastically efficacious beliefs are permissible when one finds oneself in
a situation where a decision about what to believe is, among other things, forced.
6. That definition can only be nominal, because the definition alone doesn’t capture all that there
is to say about what allows us to isolate intuition according to a pragmatic grade of clarity. There
are many uncritical processes which we wouldn’t call intuitive (or good, for that matter). 
7. This does not mean that it is impossible to discern – Atkins makes this argument in response to
de Waal (see Atkins 2016: 49-55).
8. Some of the relevant materials here are found only in the manuscripts, and for these Atkins
2016 is a very valuable guide.
9. See de Waal 2012.
10. In our view: for worse. We merely state our stance without argument here, though we say
something of these and related matters in Boyd 2012, Boyd & Heney 2017.
11. As Jaime Nubiola (2004) notes, the editors of the Collected Papers attribute the phrase “il lume
naturale” to Galileo himself, which would explain why Peirce’s discussions of il lume naturale so
often accompany discussions of  Galileo.  As Nubiola also notes,  however,  the phrase does not
appear to be one that Galileo used with any significant frequency, nor in quite the same way that
Peirce uses it.
12. The exception,  depending on how one thinks about the advance  of inquiry,  is  the use of
instinct in generating hypotheses for abductive reasoning (see CP 5.171).
13. Recall that the process of training one’s instincts up in a more reasonable direction can be
sparked by a difficulty posed mid-inquiry,  but such realignment is  not something we should
expect to accomplish swiftly. For a discussion of habituation in Peirce’s philosophy, see Massecar
2016.
14. A very stable feature of Peirce’s view as they unfold over time is that our experience of reality
includes  what  he  calls  Secondness:  “insistence  upon  being  in  some  quite  arbitrary  way  is
Secondness, which is the characteristic of the actually existing thing” (CP 7.488). Perhaps attuned
to the critic who will cry out that this is too metaphysical, Peirce gives his classic example of an
idealist being punched in the face. “[A]n idealist of that stamp is lounging down Regent Street,
thinking  of  the  utter  nonsense  of  the  opinion of  Reid,  and especially  of  the  foolish  probatio
ambulandi, when some drunken fellow who is staggering up the street unexpectedly lets fly his
fist  and knocks him in the eye.  What has become of  his  philosophical  reflections now?” (CP
5.539).  Peirce  suggests  that  the  idealist  will  come  to  appreciate  the  “objectivity”  of  the
unexpected, and rethink his stance on Reid. 
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ABSTRACTS
In addition to being a founder of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce was a scientist
and an empiricist. A core aspect of his thoroughgoing empiricism was a mindset that treats all
attitudes as revisable. His fallibilism seems to require us to constantly seek out new information,
and to not be content holding any beliefs uncritically. At the same time, Peirce often states that
common sense has an important role to play in both scientific and vital inquiry, and that there
cannot be any “direct  profit  in going behind common sense.”  Our question is  the following:
alongside a scientific mindset and a commitment to the method of inquiry, where does common
sense  fit  in?  Peirce  does  at  times  directly  address  common  sense;  however,  those  explicit
engagements are relatively infrequent. In this paper, we argue that getting a firm grip on the
role of common sense in Peirce’s philosophy requires a three-pronged investigation, targeting
his treatment of common sense alongside his more numerous remarks on intuition and instinct. By
excavating and developing Peirce’s concepts of instinct and intuition, we show that his respect
for common sense coheres with his insistence on the methodological superiority of inquiry. We
conclude that Peirce shows us the way to a distinctive epistemic position balancing fallibilism
and  anti-scepticism,  a  pragmatist  common  sense  position  of  considerable  interest  for
contemporary epistemology given current interest in the relation of intuition and reason.
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